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I. Introduction 
Imagine you have decided to run for office, to speak out 
publicly against an injustice, to enter the job market, or even to 
join a new online forum. Now, imagine after starting your chosen 
endeavor, you go online to discover that someone who disagrees 
with your position posted your personal information on the 
internet and called for others to harass you. To make matters 
worse, you realize that you cannot determine who posted your 
personal data.1 You have been doxed.2 Because you cannot identify 
the person who posted your information, where can you turn for 
recourse? The next logical party is the website where your personal 
information was posted.3 Unfortunately, under current laws online 
intermediaries are typically immunized from liability in these 
situations.4 This Note argues that this lack of legal recourse is no 
longer acceptable in the internet-dominated modern world. 
Doxing (or doxxing) is the act of releasing personal 
information on the internet without consent.5 The motivations for 
doxing vary, but this Note focuses on doxing that is done with the 
intent to cause harm and the need to provide a remedy to the 
                                                                                                     
 1. See infra notes 79–88 and accompanying text (discussing how one can 
easily hide their identity online). 
 2. See infra notes 5–13 and accompanying text (explaining doxing in further 
detail). 
 3. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(describing how a victim of anonymous cyber-harassment attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to hold AOL liable).  
 4. See infra Part III (outlining the broad immunity granted to service 
providers under the Communications Decency Act).  
 5. See Julia M. MacAllister, Note, The Doxing Dilemma: Seeking a Remedy 
for the Malicious Publication of Personal Information, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 
2455–56 (2017) (defining doxing). Personal information that is doxed often 
includes a home address, an email address, a phone number, a social security 
number, the victim’s employer and employer contact information, the victim’s 
family members’ contact information, photos of the victim, or photos of the 
victim’s children and where they attend school. See id. at 2456 (listing types of 
personal information). 
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victim.6 Doxing originated in the 1990s and quickly gained 
popularity in the hacking community.7 Originally, hackers doxed 
as a revenge tactic against other hackers.8 A hacker would dox a 
rival—revealing the rival’s identity—to try to open the victim “up 
to harassment or even law enforcement action.”9 More recently, 
however, doxing has moved beyond the hacking community and 
evolved into a form of cyber-harassment.10  
Doxing is often done anonymously, and it is frequently difficult 
to identify the perpetrator—the “doxer”—if they wish to hide their 
identity.11 Doxers typically post a victim’s personal information on 
social media sites and other websites that are widely available to 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Victoria McIntyre, Note, Do(x) You Really Want to Hurt Me: Adapting 
IIED as a Solution to Doxing by Reshaping Intent, 19 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 111, 113 (2016) (“The goal of doxing is to scare and intimidate a 
victim . . . .”); Sameer Hinduja, Doxing and Cyberbullying, CYBERBULLYING RES. 
CTR., https://cyberbullying.org/doxing-and-cyberbullying (last visited Sept. 8, 
2019) (stating doxing is done to seek revenge, to bring attention to someone who 
was previously anonymous, or even just for “kicks”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also Dylan E. Penza, Note, The Unstoppable Intrusion: 
The Unique Effect of Online Harassment and What the United States Can 
Ascertain from Other Countries’ Attempts to Prevent It, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 297, 
304 (2018) (noting doxing is also used as a form of vigilante justice where a doxer 
will “reveal the information of people in order to punish them for perceived 
crimes”).  
 7. See McIntyre, supra note 6, at 114 (explaining the term “dox” is computer 
hacker shorthand for documents).  
 8. See Mat Honan, What is Doxing?, WIRED (Mar. 6, 2014, 1:03 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2014/03/doxing/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (describing the 
origin of doxing as “an old-school revenge tactic that emerged from hacker culture 
in [the] 1990s”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 9. Id.  
 10. See Nellie Veronika Binder, Note, From the Message Board to the Front 
Door: Addressing the Offline Consequences of Race and Gender-Based Doxxing 
and Swatting, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 55, 58 (2018) (“Doxxers now routinely release 
a person’s private information online with the intention of inciting other Internet 
users to harass that victim.”); Nellie Bowles, How ‘Doxxing’ Became a Mainstream 
Tool in the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/technology/doxxing-protests.html (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2019) (noting doxing originated in the hacking community, but 
recently “doxxing has emerged from subculture websites like 4Chan and Reddit 
to become something of a mainstream phenomenon”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 11. See Emma Marshak, Online Harassment: A Legislative Solution, 54 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 503, 505 (2017) (“Half of the victims of online harassment do 
not know the perpetrators.”); infra notes 79–85 and accompanying text (outlining 
how one can mask their identity online).  
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the public, such as Wikipedia or Twitter.12 Once someone is doxed, 
anyone with access to the internet can find and use the information 
to perpetuate the harassment.13 
Current examples of doxing are all too common. The home 
address and phone number of Dr. Christine Blasey Ford, the 
woman who accused Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh of 
sexual assault, were posted on Twitter after she came forward 
publicly with her accusations.14 After being doxed, Dr. Ford 
received death threats and other harassing messages, which 
ultimately caused her and her family to flee their home.15 
Additionally, during the September 2018 Kavanaugh hearing, 
three Republican Senators— Lindsey Graham, Mike Lee, and 
Orrin Hatch — were doxed.16 The Senators’ home addresses and 
                                                                                                     
 12. See Binder, supra note 10, at 59–60 (“[B]ecause doxed data remains 
online until the harasser or the hosting site removes it, the information continues 
to corrode victims’ professional and social reputations long after the initial 
harassment occurs.”); see, e.g., McAllister, supra note 5, at 2452 (recounting the 
doxing of Brianna Wu, who received rape and death threat tweets that included 
photos of her and her husband and their home address).  
 13. See McIntyre, supra note 6, at 112 (noting once personal information is 
doxed, others can use the information and continue to threaten a victim and often 
“[i]t is impossible to know who is behind the threats because they are able to hide 
behind various accounts on the Internet”).  
 14. See Jesselyn Cook, A Troll Doxxed Christine Blasey Ford. Twitter Let 
Him Back on Its Platform in Hours, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 20, 2018, 12:14 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/troll-doxxed-christine-blasey-ford-
twitter_us_5ba3ba6ee4b069d5f9d0ce92 (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (“[O]thers 
retweeted the messages and copied them onto Reddit, further disseminating 
Blasey’s contact details.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 15.  See id. (explaining how the rapid dissemination of Dr. Ford’s personal 
information forced her family to flee their home). Brett Kavanaugh’s wife, Ashley, 
received death threats in her government email inbox leading up to the 
September 2018 hearing. See William Cummings & Christal Hayes, Death 
Threats Target Brett Kavanaugh’s Family, Woman Who Accused Him of Sexual 
Assault, USA TODAY (Sept. 20, 2018, 6:35 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2018/09/20/death-
threats-brett- kavanaugh-christine-blasey-ford/1371995002/ (last visited Sept. 
8, 2019) (recounting that Kavanaugh’s wife received multiple threatening emails 
to her government email) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Because Mrs. Kavanaugh is a Town Manager for the Maryland Village of Chevy 
Chase, her work email address is available online and her information was not 
doxed. See The Village of Chevy Chase Section 5, VILLAGE OF CHEVY CHASE, 
http://www.chevychasesection5.org/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (listing Ashley 
Kavanaugh as Town Manager and providing an email address to contact her) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 16. See Lukas Mikelionis, Republican Senators Doxxed on Wikipedia by 
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personal cell phone numbers were posted on Wikipedia and then 
shared on Twitter.17  
Doxing victims also include those not in the public eye. 
Numerous college professors have been doxed after discussing 
controversial topics.18 In Washington state in December 2018, a 
student secretly filmed his high school teacher’s lecture on the 
Swedish YouTube sensation Felix Kjellberg.19 During his lecture, 
the teacher criticized Kjellberg “for promoting racism and 
anti-Semitism.”20 After the student posted the video on Twitter, 
followers of Kjellberg made public attempts to gather the teacher’s 
name and personal information to dox him.21  
Doxing creates harm offline in the real world because the 
personal information posted is accessible to anyone with an 
internet connection.22 Once the personal information is on these 
public sites, it is available for anyone to view (and use) and difficult 
to remove.23 Doxing’s harms include harassment, physical harm, 
                                                                                                     
Someone from House of Representatives After Kavanaugh Hearing, FOX NEWS 
(Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/republican-senators-doxxed-
on-wikipedia-by-someone-from-house-of-representatives-after-kavanaugh-
hearing (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (“The leaking of information occurred 
sometime after the three lawmakers questioned Kavanaugh.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 17. See id. (“The intentional publication of the information was first caught 
by a Twitter bot that automatically tracks any changes made to the Wikipedia 
entries from anyone located in the U.S. Congress and publicizes them on the social 
media site.”). 
 18. See Asia Fields, Secret Video of Teacher Criticizing YouTuber Goes Viral, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 23, 2018, at B1 (“Some professors have lost jobs or become 
scared for the safety of their family after being harassed or doxed.”); see also 
Bowles, supra note 10 (noting a professor from Arkansas who was doxed in 2017 
and wrongly accused of participating in a neo-Nazi march). 
 19. See Fields, supra note 18, at B1 (discussing that the teacher’s lecture on 
fake news criticized Kjellberg).  
 20. Id.  
 21. See id. (recounting that “Kjellberg saw the post and retweeted it,” which 
led to others also reposting it). 
 22. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 20 (2014) 
(“Harassing posts are situated wherever there are individuals who view them and 
thus they have a profound influence over victims’ lives.”); Layla Goldnick, Note, 
Coddling the Internet: How the CDA Exacerbates the Proliferation of Revenge Porn 
and Prevents a Meaningful Remedy for Its Victims, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 
583, 591 (2015) (articulating how victims of doxing experience real life harms 
offline when their personal information is posted).  
 23. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY 
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and financial harm.24 Doxing victims are also at an increased risk 
of identity theft.25  
Doxing tactics also include more severe forms, such as revenge 
porn26 or swatting.27 Revenge porn is the posting of intimate 
images of another person without permission.28 The images are 
typically posted with offensive remarks about the person and often 
include links to the victim’s social media profiles and to other 
personal information.29 Swatting is a form of cyber-harassment 
where someone will call in a false report to authorities that leads 
police to dispatch heavily armed tactical units to a victim’s home.30 
States have criminalized swatting; however, because the call to 
authorities is typically placed anonymously, the perpetrator often 
                                                                                                     
TECH. L.J. 1103, 1112 (2011) (explaining how even if content is removed from one 
website it can “be cached and copied on other websites”); John B. Major, Note, 
Cyberstalking, Twitter, and the Captive Audience: A First Amendment Analysis of 
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 124 (2012) (outlining how even if 
someone blocks a Twitter user, their posts can still be located in searches). 
 24. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 10 (stating that the average cost of 
cyber-harassment is $1,200 due to legal fees, child care costs, and moving 
expenses).  
 25. See Marshak, supra note 11, at 513 (“Doxxing has an economic impact 
both when the victim takes expensive preventative measures and when the 
publication of private information is followed by more harassment or threats.”); 
Binder, supra note 10, at 59 (providing that doxing often includes encouragement 
to cause physical harm to the victim and when a doxer releases social security 
numbers or other financial account information, doxing raises the victim’s 
potential for identity theft).  
 26. See Goldnick, supra note 22, at 585 (discussing revenge porn and 
explaining how it is becoming more common).  
 27. See Binder, supra note 10, at 55 (explaining how swatting and doxing are 
related).  
 28. See Goldnick, supra note 22, at 585–86 (defining revenge porn and 
discussing the lack of legal recourse for many victims of revenge porn).  
 29.  See id. at 586 (“The most damaging revenge websites actually link the 
illicit content to legitimate social networking and media sites like Facebook, 
Twitter, and LinkedIn.”). 
 30. See Binder, supra note 10, at 55 (discussing a Massachusetts 
Congresswoman who was a swatting victim after an anonymous caller reported 
the Representative’s “home was under attack by an ‘active’ shooter”).  
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cannot be identified or prosecuted.31 Existing federal laws do not 
expressly address swatting.32 
Swatting often stems from doxing,33 and it is inherently 
dangerous because both the SWAT team and the victim are 
prompted to act based on inaccurate or incomplete information.34 
Swatting has even led to death35 and the physical injury of victims 
caught up in these situations.36 In addition to endangering both 
police and victims, swatting wastes government resources as first 
responder teams are deployed to address a non-existent threat.37  
Doxing can cause harm to anyone who incites the wrath of the 
cybermob.38 However, doxing and other forms of cyber-harassment 
                                                                                                     
 31. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 148.3 (West 2014) (criminalizing knowingly 
making a false report of an emergency); Ryan Grenoble, ‘Swatting’ is Endangering 
Lives, Aided in Part by a Legal Loophole, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2019, 3:59 
PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/deadly-prank-endangering-lives_us_5b17 
fca6e4b09578259e132b (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (“Tracking down and arresting 
a swatter is often a difficult, costly endeavor, requiring investigators to cross local, 
state and international borders alike in search of call logs on servers.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 32. Grenoble, supra note 31. 
 33. Binder, supra note 10, at 55. 
 34. See id. at 60 (explaining why swatting is the most extreme form of 
doxing); Matthew James Enzweiler, Note, Swatting Political Discourse: A 
Domestic Terrorism Threat, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2015) (“The 
authorities respond with weapons drawn, expecting a high-risk incident, thereby 
creating a dangerous situation for the unsuspecting swatting victim and police 
alike.”). 
 35. See Brett Molina, California Man Pleads Guilty After ‘Swatting’ Call Led 
to Kansas Man’s Death, USA TODAY (Nov. 14, 2018, 1:40 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/11/14/man-pleads-guilty-
call-duty-hoax-leading-deadly-swatting/1999789002/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) 
(describing how a swatting victim was fatally shot by police after a man falsely 
reported a hostage situation at the victim’s home) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).   
 36. See Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Swatting: The New Cyberbullying Frontier After 
Elonis v. United States, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 455, 457, 471 (2016) (recounting the 
swatting of Tyran Dobbs, who was shot twice with rubber bullets, once in the face, 
during a swatting incident at his apartment).  
 37. See Binder, supra note 10, at 60 (outlining how swatting diverts 
resources from actual emergencies and wastes taxpayers dollars); Enzweiler, 
supra note 34, at 2003 (noting how swatting is expensive because the false threats 
mobilize mass responses by authorities). 
 38. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 21 (“The United States is not alone in 
struggling with cyber harassment.”).  
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disproportionately affect women.39 Women of color encounter more 
harassment than any other group.40 Both academic studies and 
law enforcement studies support this conclusion.41 On the other 
hand, men are often attacked online for their ideas or actions.42 In 
short, doxing causes real harm and society is slowly starting to 
recognize the true cost of this behavior.  
Despite growing awareness of doxing’s pernicious 
consequences, existing laws do not adequately address either the 
underlying behavior or its consequences.43 Some signs of progress, 
however, are emerging. Proposed legislation in the U.S. House of 
Representatives — the Online Safety Modernization Act of 2017 
(Online Safety Act)44 — would provide for federal criminal and civil 
liability for doxing.45 This bill is a step forward, but it does not 
address the lack of legal recourse for a victim if the person posting 
the information cannot be identified.46 This Note aims to explain 
                                                                                                     
 39. See id. at 13 (“Of the 3,393 individuals reporting cyber harassment to 
WHOA [Working to Halt Online Abuse] from 2000 to 2011, 72.5 percent were 
female and 22.5 percent were male (5 percent were unknown).”); Binder, supra 
note 10, at 61 (“Online harassers routinely objectify women on their physical 
appearances, and doxxing is regularly accompanied by threats of sexual 
violence.”).  
 40. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 14 (“Nonwhite females face cyber 
harassment more than any other group, with 53 percent reporting having been 
harassed online.”).  
 41.  See id. (“The most recent Bureau of Justice Statistics report found that 
seventy-four percent of individuals who were stalked on- or offline were female, 
and twenty-six percent were male.”); Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive 
Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 373 (2009) 
(“Grappling with the trivialization of cyber gender harassment is a crucial step to 
understanding and combating the harm that it inflicts.”).  
 42.  See CITRON, supra note 22, at 15 (“When men face cyber harassment, 
their experience often resonates with the abuse faced by women.”).  
 43. See Binder, supra note 10, at 56 (explaining current laws do not 
adequately address doxing or swatting); Lipton, supra note 23, at 1106 (“The 
prevalence of this conduct suggests that more effective means are necessary to 
redress online wrongs and to protect victims’ reputations, but action against 
cyber-abusers has posed significant challenges for the legal system.”).  
 44. H.R. 3067, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2017).   
 45. See id. (proposing to amend the federal criminal code for doxing and 
swatting).   
 46.  See Binder, supra note 10, at 63 (“Harassers can post destructive content 
anonymously, and often evade law enforcement officials by exploiting 
location-obstructing technology and jurisdictional boundaries.”). 
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why it is appropriate, and necessary, to hold online intermediaries 
secondarily liable when the doxer cannot be identified.  
For the purposes of this Note, an online intermediary is a 
company that facilitates access to the internet.47 The phrase is 
broad and encompasses internet service providers, search engines, 
and social media platforms.48 Throughout this Note, the 
unidentified doxer will be referred to as the “ghost doxer” and the 
target of the doxing will be referred to as the “victim.”  
This Note contends in Parts II–III that the standards of 
conduct to which the public holds online intermediaries have 
changed since the internet developed in the early 1990s. As a 
result, the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)49 — which 
offers broad immunity to online intermediaries for content posted 
by third-parties — should be amended to address the harm caused 
by doxing. The doxing CDA amendment could parallel the 2018 
sex-trafficking CDA amendment and allow an online intermediary 
to be potentially liable if violations of the new federal law on doxing 
and ghost doxing occur on their site.50  
Part IV argues that copyright law can provide a model for 
legislation to impose secondary liability on online intermediaries 
for ghost doxing. Under copyright law, secondary liability is broken 
into two categories —contributory liability and vicarious liability.51 
Therefore, the ghost doxing liability scheme could have two 
components. First, online intermediaries that encourage doxing 
could be held liable under a contributory liability theory.52 Under 
                                                                                                     
 47. See KARINE PERSET, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ROLE OF INTERNET 
INTERMEDIARIES 9 (2010) (stating internet intermediaries “facilitate transactions 
between third parties on the internet”), 
https://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf. 
 48.  Frequently Asked Questions on Internet Intermediary Liability, ASS’N 
FOR PROGRESSIVE COMMS., https://www.apc.org/en/pubs/apc%E2%80%99s-
frequently-asked-questions-internet-intermed (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (listing 
types of internet intermediaries such as network operators, internet access 
providers, internet service providers, hosting providers, search engines, social 
networks, and other blogs or websites with comment sections) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 49. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 50. See infra Part III.B (delineating this Note’s proposed doxing § 230 
amendment).  
 51. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
434 – 35 (1984) (discussing copyright law’s secondary liability scheme).  
 52. See infra Part IV (outlining copyright’s secondary liability scheme and 
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copyright law, contributory copyright infringement occurs when 
one intentionally induces or encourages direct infringement.53 
Second, for websites where non-inducement doxing occurs, online 
intermediaries could be held vicariously liable in instances where 
notice is given and the online intermediary fails to remove the 
doxing content.54 Vicarious liability in copyright can be imposed 
when one has “the right and ability to supervise the infringing 
activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.”55 
This Note argues the doxing notice and takedown provision could 
be modeled off the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),56 
which provides safe harbor provisions for internet service 
providers who remove copyright infringing material following 
written notice.57 Overall, this Note proposes a ghost doxing 
liability scheme — modeled off copyright law’s secondary liability 
theories   — be added into the proposed federal bill on doxing. 
II. Times Have Changed for Online Intermediaries 
The internet is no longer a new frontier that should be afforded 
Wild West status.58 New laws are needed because today’s internet 
is far more pervasive and has a completely different configuration 
than the internet when it was first developed.59 First, the number 
                                                                                                     
arguing how it can be applied to doxing).  
 53. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
930 (2005) (describing contributory copyright infringement).  
 54. See infra Part IV (explaining how copyright law’s secondary liability 
scheme can be applied to doxing).  
 55. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (citations omitted). 
 56. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205, 1301–1332, 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012).  
 57. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (providing various safe harbors from indirect 
copyright infringement for internet service providers who comply with the 
statute). 
 58. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 79, 102 (arguing the notion of the Wild 
West internet is “based on a false set of assumptions”).  
 59. See id. at 102 (“Just as harm in the workplace and home have profound 
social consequences, so too does harassment in networked spaces.”); Marshak, 
supra note 11, at 504 (“Online threats and harassment are a growing problem as 
life moves online, and the current set of state laws, which were mostly developed 
in the 1990s, generally lack the vocabulary and framework to address criminal 
behavior that occurs in cyberspace rather than physical space.”). 
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of people with consistent internet access in the 1990s was a 
fraction of what it is now.60 Second, blogs and other online 
discussion boards — which are the epicenter of 
cyber-harassment — did not even exist in the mid-1990s.61 Third, 
many of the behemoth online companies that currently dominate 
the online marketplace, such as Facebook, did not exist in the 
1990s.62  
Today, more than one billion people use Facebook daily.63 The 
reach and influence of companies such as Facebook was 
unimaginable in the mid-1990s.64 Congress is just beginning to 
discuss the need to address the issues created by the reach of these 
companies.65 The April 2018 congressional hearing with 
Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg supports the contention that the 
standard to which the public holds online intermediaries is 
tightening.66 During the hearing, Senator Chuck Grassley stated, 
“[t]he tech industry has an obligation to respond to widespread and 
growing concerns over data privacy and security and to restore the 
                                                                                                     
 60. See Reuben Fischer-Baum, What ‘Tech World’ Did You Grow Up In?, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/MCV5-EKZF (last visited Sept. 8, 
2019) (noting that in 1996 seventy-five percent of American households had no 
internet) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 61. See Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization 
of Online Harassment, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 383, 390 (2009) (“[T]he Internet 
was structured very differently in 1996, and the opportunities for anonymous 
harassment of women outside of community structures were far fewer, as blogs 
and online discussion boards as currently structured did not exist.”). 
 62. See Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebook/about/? 
ref=page_internal (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (stating Facebook was founded on 
February 4, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 63. See Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data: 
Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the U.S. S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Senator John 
Thune) [hereinafter Facebook Comm. Hearing] (“More than 2 billion people use 
Facebook every month 1.4 billion people use it every day; more than the 
population of any country on Earth except China, and more than four times the 
population of the United States.”),http://www.astrid-
online.it/static/upload/zuck/zuckerberg_senate-hearing-transcript_10_04_18.pdf. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. (statement of Senator Bill Nelson) (“And, if Facebook and other 
online companies will not or cannot fix the privacy invasions, then we are going 
to have  to—we, the Congress.”). 
 66. See id. (statement of Senator John Thune) (“We want to hear more, 
without delay, about what Facebook and other companies plan to do to take 
greater responsibility for what happens on their platforms.”). 
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public’s trust. The status quo no longer works.”67 These hearings 
are strong evidence that society is starting to demand that online 
intermediaries be held to a higher standard than they were in the 
early days of the internet.68  
A. Proposed Federal Doxing Legislation — Online Safety 
Modernization Act of 2017  
Members of Congress are starting to recognize the need to 
address cyber-harassment (such as doxing) through specific 
legislation.69 The proposed Online Safety Act bill addresses both 
criminal and civil liability.70 Doxing would be a criminal violation: 
Whoever uses the mail or any facility or means of interstate or 
foreign commerce, to knowingly publish a person’s personally 
identifiable information — (1) with the intent to threaten, 
intimidate, or harass any person, incite or facilitate the 
commission of a crime of violence against any person, or place any 
person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury; or 
(2) with the intent that the information will be used to threaten, 
intimidate, or harass any person, incite or facilitate the 
commission of a crime of violence against any person, or place any 
person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or 
both.71  
                                                                                                     
 67.  Id. (statement of Senator Chuck Grassley).  
 68. See id. (statement of Senator John Thune) (“In the past, many of my 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle have been willing to defer to tech companies’ 
efforts to regulate themselves, but this may be changing.”); see also Jaffe, supra 
note 36, at 467 (discussing how “the reasonable standard may change in favor of 
the broadcaster to cast a wider security net over the channels being used”). 
 69. See H.R. 3067, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2017) (listing the sponsor of the 
proposed federal doxing bill as Representative Katherine Clark from 
Massachusetts and indicating co-sponsors, including representatives from 
Indiana, California, Florida, Georgia, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and 
Tennessee).  
 70. See id. (proposing the section “Interstate Doxxing Prevention” which 
would amend 18 U.S.C. §§ 871-880 to hold a doxer criminally liable and provide 
a civil cause of action to a victim). 
 71. Id. (emphasis added).  
REACHING THROUGH THE GHOST DOXER 1319 
Further, Title II of the bill proposes criminal and civil liability 
for swatting.72 The bill also directs the Department of Justice to 
develop a strategy to reduce, investigate, and prosecute 
cybercrimes against individuals, and to publish statistics on 
cybercrimes against individuals.73  
Massachusetts Representative Katherine Clark , the sponsor 
of the Online Safety Act, is one of Congress’s most avid anti-doxing 
advocates.74 The Congresswoman was even a swatting victim 
herself in 2016.75 Representative Clark has introduced multiple 
bills that address swatting and other forms of cyber-harassment.76 
Unfortunately, none of these proposed bills have been passed into 
law.77 On the whole, these proposed bills on doxing and swatting 
acknowledge the growing need for doxing victims to have legal 
recourse. The various proposed doxing bills, however, do not 
address individuals victimized by ghost doxers.78  
 
B. Anonymity on the Internet 
The problem of the ghost doxer is common and should not be 
ignored.79 Today, anonymity on the internet can be achieved with 
                                                                                                     
 72. See id. (proposing criminal liability for anyone who “knowingly 
transmit[s] false or misleading information that would reasonably be expected to 
cause an emergency response” in the absence of circumstances reasonably 
requiring an emergency response).  
 73. See id. (“The Attorney General shall develop a national strategy to 
reduce the incidence of cybercrimes against individuals . . . .”).  
 74. See Lisa Bei Li, Note, Data Privacy in the Cyber Age: Recommendations 
for Regulating Doxing and Swatting, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 317, 325 (2018) 
(discussing Representative Clark’s various anti-doxing proposals).  
 75. See Press Release, Katherine Clark, U.S. Representative for the 5th 
District of Massachusetts, Congresswoman Katherine Clark Target of Swatting 
Hoax (Feb. 3, 2016) (explaining on the evening of January 31, 2016 the police 
received an anonymous call claiming there was an active shooter at 
Representative Clark’s home) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 76. See Li, supra note 74, at 325 (stating Representative Clark sponsored 
multiple bills to combat cyber-harassment).  
 77. See id. (noting none of the proposed bills on doxing or swatting have been 
enacted by Congress yet).  
 78. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 221–24 (indicating that online harassers 
cannot be prosecuted if the individual cannot be identified).  
 79. See Lipton, supra note 23, at 1114 (“The anonymity provided by the 
Internet may increase the volume of abusive conduct because it may encourage 
individuals who would not engage in such conduct offline to do so in the 
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relative ease.80 For example, Tor is an internet network that allows 
its users to remain anonymous online by hiding their IP 
addresses.81 To make matters worse, ghost doxers are more likely 
to be bolder and tend to go further than when their identity is 
known.82 While in some instances a victim can obtain a court order 
to identify a ghost doxer, these “John Doe” subpoenas  are often 
difficult to obtain.83 A court will issue a John Doe subpoena only 
after the victim navigates the procedural requirements and makes 
the necessary showing required by the authorizing law or rule.84  
                                                                                                     
anonymous virtual forum provided by the Internet—people are less inhibited 
when faced with a computer terminal . . . .”); Marshak, supra note 11, at 523 
(proposing legislation on doxing and noting “that even anonymous communication 
is criminalized [in the proposed legislation] so that future developments in related 
laws, such as those governing the statute of protective orders, will be easily 
transferred to this statute”); Binder, supra note 10, at 63 (noting harassers often 
post anonymously and use technology to avoid being identified). 
 80. See Miriam R. Albert, E-Buyer Beware: Why Online Auction Fraud 
Should Be Regulated, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 575, 592 n.74 (2002) (explaining that one’s 
online identity can be concealed through the use of “anonymous emails, 
short-lived Web-sites, and falsified domain name registrations”); Michael 
Froomkin, “PETs Must Be on a Leash”: How U.S. Law (and Industry Practice) 
Often Undermines and Even Forbids Valuable Privacy Enhancing Technology, 74 
OHIO ST. L.J. 965, 986 (2013) (discussing how Internet Protocol (IP) numbers can 
be masked to conceal one’s identity); Kristine Gallardo, Note, Taming the Internet 
Pitchfork Mob: Online Public Shaming, the Viral Media Age, and the 
Communications Decency Act, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 721, 729 (2017) (“[T]he 
existence of an IP address alone, without additional identifying information, 
cannot pinpoint the absolute identity of an online poster.”). 
 81. See McIntyre, supra note 6, at 114 (“Doxbin, a Tor site used to host files 
containing the personal information of individuals and certain groups of people, 
was launched in 2011.”); Tor FAQ, TOR PROJECT, 
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#WhatIsTor (last visited Sept. 8, 
2019) (“Tor is a program you can run on your computer . . . [i]t protects you by 
bouncing your communications around a distributed network of relays . . . it 
prevents somebody watching your Internet connection from learning what sites 
you visit . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 82. See Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 
UTAH L. REV. 993, 1009 [hereinafter Web Site Proprietorship] (“Anonymity also 
reduces accountability and accuracy.”); Gallardo, supra note 80, at 728 (“[I]t is 
much easier to criticize someone’s actions when you can do so anonymously.”). 
 83. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 223 (“Courts protect the identity of 
anonymous posts from frivolous lawsuits by setting forth a series of requirements 
before granting these [John Doe] subpoenas.”).  
 84. See Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent 
Legal Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320, 325 (2008) (noting how the standard courts 
use for John Doe subpoenas is varied).  
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Overall, it is relatively easy for a doxer to shield their identity 
online if they have a desire to do so.85 Anonymity online, however, 
has many benefits.86 For example, anonymity online can allow 
those dealing with sensitive issues — such as domestic violence 
survivors seeking support — to receive assistance that they 
otherwise might not obtain.87 Therefore, this Note does not argue 
that anonymity online should be discouraged or that anonymous 
online speech is detrimental. Rather, this Note argues that the 
laws surrounding the discourse on the internet must be updated to 
reflect the modern reality of cyber-crimes and cyber-harassment 
such as doxing.88  
C. Privacy and First Amendment Concerns with Regulating 
Doxing 
Doxing inherently implicates both an individual’s privacy and 
free speech.89 Free speech advocates sometimes express concern 
about regulating cyber-harassment because of the potential 
chilling effect on free speech.90 A full discussion of the potential 
                                                                                                     
 85. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 55 (recounting a blogger experiencing 
cyber-harassment who was unable to identify her harassers even with the 
assistance of a paid forensic computer expert); Binder, supra note 10, at 71 
(“Moreover, the anonymity of the web makes it difficult for victims to know who 
is attacking them, and the lack of legal repercussions for unmasked harassers has 
only emboldened doxxers and swatters.”); Russell Brandom, Finding Fuboy: One 
Man Spent Four Years and $35,000 to Unmask His Internet Troll, VERGE (Nov. 
23, 2018, 8:50 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/11/23/9772824/commenter-
defamation-lawsuit-identity-revealed (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (examining the 
story of a politician in Illinois who sought to identify the person who had 
compared him to Jerry Sandusky online) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 86. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 60–61 (explaining anonymity online has 
many benefits, such as support for marginalized groups). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. at 20 (stating cyber-harassment is a major issue that needs to be 
addressed).  
 89. See id. at 190 (arguing a legal regime governing cyber-harassment would 
not necessarily “undermine our commitment to free speech”); MacAllister, supra 
note 5, at 2462 (noting how as technology evolves notions of privacy also evolve). 
 90. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 191 (“Many resist the regulation of the 
online speech as antithetical to our commitment to public discourse because the 
Internet is the ‘equivalent of the public square.’”); Lipton, supra note 23, at 1128 
(discussing how the First Amendment is implicated when attempting to regulate 
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First Amendment challenges to doxing legislation is outside the 
scope of this Note. However, it is important to momentarily discuss 
the competing doctrines of privacy and free speech because speech 
on the internet can have a global reach almost instantly and a 
lasting effect.91  
Justice Louis Brandeis stated that “the right to be let alone 
[is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.”92 Privacy consists of two main constitutional 
values: “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters” and “the interest in independence in making certain 
kinds of important decisions.”93 Doxing uniquely implicates both of 
these values, as many times the doxed content will follow the 
victim online for an extended period of time.94 Privacy interests, 
however, must be balanced by free speech considerations.95  
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”96 First Amendment 
jurisprudence rests on the idea that “the government may not 
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the 
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”97 The Supreme Court 
articulated in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union98 that online 
speech is awarded the same First Amendment protection as offline 
speech.99 The right to free speech, however, is not absolute and 
some categories of speech are not protected.100  
                                                                                                     
cyber-harassment).  
 91. See Gallardo, supra note 80, at 728 (stating an estimated 3.2 billion 
people have access to the internet).  
 92.  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting).  
 93. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 
749, 762 (1989) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 589–600 (1977)).  
 94. See MacAllister, supra note 5, at 2462 (explaining how online content can 
often remain viewable for a long time).  
 95. See id. (“The right to privacy is not absolute . . . .”).  
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. I.   
 97. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 98. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  
 99. See id. at 870 (discussing the internet, the Supreme Court stated “[w]e 
agree . . . that our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First 
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium”). 
 100.  See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“These 
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
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Regulating doxing illuminates the tension between privacy 
and free speech. In Cohen v. California,101 the Supreme Court 
stated the ability to regulate speech depends on whether 
“substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially 
intolerable manner.”102 Doxing is arguably invading a substantial 
individual privacy interest in an intolerable manner because of the 
harm doxing causes offline.103 
Further, conduct, unlike speech, is not under First 
Amendment protection.104 Focusing on the conduct aspect could 
reduce or avoid First Amendment concerns for doxing.105 Overall, 
attempts to regulate online speech will likely be met with First 
Amendment challenges.106 Congress (hopefully) can draft a statute 
for doxing that mitigates potential First Amendment challenges.107  
III. Amending the Communications Decency Act for Doxing 
Congress’s careful drafting of a federal law on doxing should 
be done in conjunction with an amendment to the Communications 
                                                                                                     
incite an immediate breach of the peace.”). Threats are also not constitutionally 
protected. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–59 (2003) (explaining the First 
Amendment permits Congress or a state to ban a “true threat”); see also Watts v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (stating political hyperbole is not a true 
threat). 
 101. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).  
 102. Id. at 21.  
 103. See supra notes 22–42 and accompanying text (describing the offline 
harm doxing causes).  
 104. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1996) (“We cannot accept 
the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ 
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an 
idea.”); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Cohen’s absurd and 
immature antic, in my view, was mainly conduct and little speech.”). 
 105. See Li, supra note 74, at 320 (arguing the best way to mitigate First 
Amendment issues with regulating doxing and swatting is to focus on the conduct 
aspect of both). 
 106. See MacAllister, supra note 5, at 2463 (explaining likely First 
Amendment challenges to doxing will be that the statute is void for vagueness 
and overly broad). 
 107. Cf. Lipton, supra note 23, at 1128 (“In the physical world, statutes have 
successfully criminalized offline analogs to many of today’s online wrongs. There 
is no reason why judges cannot continue to draw lines between protected and 
prohibited speech in the online context.”). 
1324 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1307 (2019) 
Decency Act (CDA) of 1996.108 The CDA, also referred to as § 230, 
was originally enacted when the internet was still in its infancy to 
allow for the development of the new medium.109 Specifically, the 
CDA was enacted in part as a response to Stratton Oakmont, Inc. 
v. Prodigy Services Co.110 Stratton Oakmont was a New York state 
court case that found Prodigy, a computer network with two 
million subscribers, liable for an anonymous defamatory message 
posted on one of its online bulletin boards — “Money Talk.”111 The 
court found that Prodigy was a publisher — and subject to 
defamation liability — because it filtered some offensive content 
from its site.112  
Under the reasoning of Stratton Oakmont, interactive 
computer services could escape liability if they never removed 
offensive content, but they would be subject to liability if they ever 
removed offensive content.113 In enacting the CDA, “Congress 
sought to immunize the removal of user-generated content, not the 
creation of content” and thus avoid penalizing online 
intermediaries for removing offensive material.114 Further, the 
CDA is particularly powerful because it preempts any state or local 
laws that are inconsistent with it.115 Specifically, 
                                                                                                     
 108. 47 U.S.C. § 230.   
 109. See id. § 230(a) (noting the Congressional finding that “[t]he Internet and 
other interactive computer services have flourished to the benefit of all 
Americans, with a minimum of government regulation”). 
 110. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995); see Zeran 
v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing how Congress 
passed CDA § 230 in part as a response to Stratton Oakmont and aimed to 
encourage interactive computer services to “self-regulate the dissemination of 
offensive material over their services”); Goldnick, supra note 22, at 599 
(explaining Congress passed CDA in response to Stratton Oakmont).  
 111. See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *1–2 (describing how the 
defendant’s website functioned).  
 112. See id. at *10 (“[T]his Court is compelled to conclude that for the purposes 
of plaintiff’s’ claims in this action, Prodigy is a publisher . . . .”).  
 113. Cf. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (discussing how Congress in passing the CDA sought to overturn 
Stratton Oakmont).  
 114. Id.  
 115. See § 230(e)(3) (“No cause of action may be brought and no liability may 
be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”); 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding Yahoo! was 
immune from liability under CDA § 230(c)(1) for an Oregon state law negligent 
undertaking claim when the company did not remove the offensive content 
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§ 230(c)— Protection for “Good Samaritan” Blocking and Screening 
of Offensive Material — states “[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”116 Thus, an online intermediary enjoys 
immunity unless it crosses the line from service provider to content 
provider.117  
 
A. Lessons from Zeran v. American Online and Barnes v. Yahoo! 
Zeran v. America Online, Inc.118 —an early ghost doxing 
case119— was instrumental in extending broad § 230 immunity to 
internet service providers.120 The plaintiff Ken Zeran was wrongly 
associated with many offensive anonymous posts about the 
Oklahoma City Bombing.121 The anonymous posts, which began 
within a week of the bombing, advertised the sale of shirts and 
other merchandise “featuring offensive and tasteless slogans 
related to the bombing.”122 The advertisements included Zeran’s 
home phone number and instructed viewers to call Zeran 
regarding the merchandise.123 The anonymous poster continued to 
advertise additional merchandise online, and “interested buyers 
                                                                                                     
Barnes’ former boyfriend posted on their site); see also Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for 
Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(“[G]iven § 230(c)(1) it cannot sue the messenger just because the messenger 
reveals a third party’s plan to engage in unlawful discrimination.”).  
 116. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).  
 117. See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100–01 (“[S]ubsection (c)(1) only protects from 
liability (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer services (2) whom a 
plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker 
(3) of information provided by another information content provider.”); Goldnick, 
supra note 22, at 601–02 (articulating the difference between an internet service 
provider and an online content provider).  
 118. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). 
 119. See id. at 329 (outlining that the plaintiff’s claim against AOL was based 
on a series of anonymous postings). 
 120. See Bartow, supra note 61, at 390 (stating Zeran was the instrumental 
case in establishing internet service provider (ISP) immunity under § 230). 
 121. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329 (providing that the Oklahoma City Bombing 
took place on April 19, 1995).  
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. (explaining Zeran could not change his home phone number 
because he ran his business out of his house).  
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were told to call Zeran’s phone number.”124 Due to these posts, 
Zeran received numerous angry and threatening calls, including 
death threats.125 Zeran contacted AOL and requested that they 
remove the posts.126 Ultimately, Zeran sued AOL for the 
defamatory speech on its platform posted by an unknown third 
party.127 The Fourth Circuit found that AOL fit squarely within 
§ 230 and was therefore immune.128 Zeran had no other recourse 
as he could not identify his ghost doxer.129 
Additionally, one of the most concerning aspects of § 230 is 
that online intermediaries continue to enjoy immunity even after 
a victim notifies them of doxed content and requests its removal.130 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.131 provides a striking example. In 2004, 
Cecilia Barnes ended a relationship with her boyfriend.132 He 
responded by posting nude photos of Barnes on various Yahoo! 
profiles without her permission.133 The profiles also “included the 
addresses, real and electronic, and the telephone number at 
Barnes’ place of employment.”134 Barnes’s ex-boyfriend also posted 
in online chat rooms and directed male correspondents to the 
                                                                                                     
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. (“By April 30, Zeran was receiving an abusive phone call 
approximately every two minutes.”). 
 126. See id. (“The parties dispute the date that AOL removed this original 
posting from its bulletin board.”). 
 127. See id. at 330 (noting that AOL raised § 230 as an affirmative defense).  
 128. See id. at 332 (“AOL falls squarely within this traditional definition of a 
publisher and, therefore is clearly protected by § 230’s immunity.”).  
 129. See id. at 329 n.1 (quoting Zeran’s statement that AOL “made it 
impossible to identify the original party by failing to maintain adequate records 
of its users”); DAVID J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND 
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 152 (2007) (“He couldn’t track down the anonymous 
person who posted the T-shirt ads. He couldn’t sue AOL. He had no way to fight 
back.”).  
 130. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(granting § 230 immunity to Yahoo! even following requests to take down the 
specific fraudulent profiles of the plaintiff); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 
327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997) (detailing that the plaintiff notified AOL of the 
defamatory content).  
 131. 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 132. See id. at 1098 (explaining the doxing of Barnes). 
 133. See id. (discussing that Barnes did not know the nude photographs of her 
had been taken). 
 134. Id.  
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profiles he created.135 Shortly following this, Barnes began to 
receive unsolicited emails, phone calls, and visits from men — all 
with the expectation of sex.136 Barnes contacted Yahoo! and asked 
the site to remove the profiles, but the company failed to take any 
action.137 Yahoo! eventually promised they would take the profiles 
offline, but never actually acted until after Barnes filed suit in 
Oregon state court.138 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling that § 230 immunized Yahoo! despite the company’s 
awareness of the profiles.139 Online intermediaries should not 
continue to be permitted to hide behind § 230’s broad immunity 
today if they are made aware of specific doxing content.140 
B. Why the CDA’s Broad Immunity is No Longer Appropriate 
In addition to stories such as Cecilia Barnes and Ken Zeran, 
there are a number of reasons why the CDA should be amended to 
permit lawsuits against online intermediaries. First, one of the 
main rationales for the CDA, the self-regulation of the internet, 
has not played out in practice.141 Second, Congress amended § 230 
                                                                                                     
 135. See id. (describing how Barnes’ ex-boyfriend continued to post to draw 
attention to the profiles he created). 
 136. See id. (stating numerous men sent Barnes unsolicited messages 
indicating they expected to have sexual relations with her).  
 137. See id. (“One month later, Yahoo! had not responded but the undesired 
advances from unknown men continued; Barnes again asked Yahoo! by mail to 
remove the profiles.”).  
 138. See id. at 1099 (noting Barnes filed suit after approximately two months 
of not hearing from Yahoo!).  
 139. See id. at 1105 (“To summarize, we hold that section 230(c) bars Barnes’ 
claim, under Oregon law, for negligent provision of services that Yahoo undertook 
to provide.”). It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit found Yahoo! could 
potentially be liable under the contract theory of promissory estoppel. Id. at 1109. 
The court ruled that Barnes could have potentially a breach of contract claim 
based on an estoppel theory because Yahoo! promised to remove the profiles and 
Barnes had relied on that promise. Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, did not rule 
on the existence of a contract regarding this claim. Id. 
 140. See infra Part III.B (explaining why and how the CDA should be 
amended for doxing).  
 141. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 
2003) (stating Congress enacted the CDA “to promote the free exchange of 
information and ideas of the internet and to encourage monitoring for offensive 
or obscene material”). 
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last year to limit the immunity of websites that facilitate sex 
trafficking.142 Third, a growing number of commentators have 
proposed amending § 230 for various types of cyber-harassment 
due to the evolution and growth of the internet since 1996.143  
First, the self-regulation of the internet has not played out in 
practice as Congress envisioned in 1996.144 Websites that 
                                                                                                     
 142. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5) (2012) (providing “[n]othing in this section, 
other than subsection (c)(2)(A) shall be construed to impair or limit” sex 
trafficking law); H.R. REP. NO. 115-572(l), at 3 (2018) (explaining the amendment 
is “designed to combat online sex trafficking by providing new tools to law 
enforcement . . . by making it easier for states to prosecute criminal actor 
websites by amending section 230 of the Communications Decency Act”); 
Facebook Comm. Hearing, supra note 63 (statement of Senator John Thune) 
(noting how Congress passed the sex trafficking amendment “in overwhelming 
bipartisan fashion”); Jeffrey Neuburger, FOSTA Signed into Law, Amends CDA 
Section 230 to Allow Enforcement Against Online Providers for Knowingly 
Facilitating Sex Trafficking, PROSKAUER, 
https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2018/04/11/fosta-signed-into-law-amends-
cda-section-230-to-allow-enforcement-against-online-providers-for-knowingly-
facilitating-sex-trafficking/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) [hereinafter FOSTA Signed 
into Law] (discussing how the FOSTA amendment aims to encourage online 
providers to “exercise greater responsibility over sex-trafficking related content”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 143. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 177–81 (proposing an amendment to limit 
immunity under § 230 to exclude “[web]sites that encourage cyberstalking or 
nonconsensual pornography and make money from its removal or that principally 
host cyber stalking or nonconsensual pornography”); Derek Bambauer, Exposed, 
98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2028–29 (2014) (outlining various scholars’ proposed 
amendments to CDA § 230 to limit the immunity granted to online 
intermediaries); Nancy S. Kim, Website Design and Liability, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 
383, 383 (2012) [hereinafter Website Design and Liability] (arguing for amending 
§ 230, but creating safe harbors for “website operators that: (1) permit only 
postings by identified posters; (2) have nonprofit status and do not accept ad 
revenue; and (3) remove postings upon request of the victim”); Goldnick, supra 
note 22, at 602–04, 626 (explaining various scholarly proposals for amending CDA 
§ 230 and arguing the CDA should be amended for websites that “encourage the 
posting of illegal or tortious content or contribute materially to illegal or tortious 
conduct are not afforded immunity”); see also Web Site Proprietorship, supra note 
82, at 999, 1034 (arguing imposing proprietorship liability on web site sponsors 
through anti-cyber-harassment policy “is consistent with section 230, as it holds 
the Web site sponsor accountable for its own actions or omissions”); see generally 
Matthew G. Jeweler, Note, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230 
is Outdated and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against 
Internet Service Providers, 8 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2008).   
 144. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 171 (“Courts have roundly immunized site 
operators from liability even though they knew or should have known that 
user-generated content contained defamation, privacy invasions, intentional 
inflictions of emotional distress, and civil rights violations.”). 
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knowingly host cyber stalking or revenge porn are likely protected 
under § 230 and are far from the “Good Samaritans” Congress 
meant to protect when it drafted the CDA.145 Further, many 
websites (such as Twitter) technically have policies that prohibit 
doxing.146 Twitter, however, is notorious for not enforcing its own 
policies.147 The ideal of internet self-regulation is not the current 
reality.148 The actual reality necessitates a change in the existing 
internet regulatory scheme.149  
Second, Congress already recognized the need to update the 
CDA by passing its 2018 amendment to limit immunity for sites 
that facilitate sex trafficking.150 The amendment limits the 
immunity provided by § 230 “for online services that knowingly 
host third-party content that promotes or facilitates sex 
trafficking.”151 While this amendment is narrow, Congress’s 
willingness to amend the CDA demonstrates the heightened 
                                                                                                     
 145. See id. at 173 (“Courts have repeatedly found that generalized knowledge 
of criminal activity on a site does not suffice to transform a site operator into a 
co-developer or co-creator of the illegal content.”). 
 146. See About Private Information on Twitter, TWITTER, 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/personal-information (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2019) (“Twitter Rules: You may not publish or post other people’s private 
information without their express authorization and permission.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 147. See Cook, supra note 14 (articulating Twitter is “notoriously bad at 
addressing” issues such as doxing even though such practices are against its 
policies).  
 148. See Facebook Comm. Hearing, supra note 63 (statement of Senator John 
Thune) (“In the past, many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle have been 
willing to defer to tech companies’ efforts to regulate themselves, but this may be 
changing.”).  
 149. See, e.g., CITRON, supra note 22, at 177 (stating the CDA should be 
amended for “sites that encourage cyber stalking or non-consensual pornography 
and make money from its removal or that principally host cyber talking or 
nonconsensual pornography”); but see Gallardo, supra note 80, at 721 (arguing 
the CDA empowers web hosts to implement policies that can help curb online 
public shaming). 
 150. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-572(l), at 3 (2018) (explaining the amendment is 
“designed to combat online sex trafficking by providing new tools to law 
enforcement . . . by making it easier for states to prosecute criminal actor 
websites”).  
 151. See FOSTA Signed into Law, supra note 142 (describing how the 
amendment encourages online providers to “exercise greater responsibility over 
sex-trafficking related content”). 
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standards for online intermediaries in today’s internet 
environment.152  
Third, numerous commentators have urged Congress to 
amend the CDA to address the growing problem of 
cyber-harassment.153 Further, some have suggested the DMCA’s 
takedown notice provisions could provide a model for a § 230 
amendment.154 These takedown notice provisions provide a safe 
harbor for internet service providers who remove copyright 
infringing material following written notice of that infringing 
content.155  
This Note, in contrast to these other proposals, advocates for 
an amendment to the CDA to permit lability for online 
intermediaries under a new federal cause of action for doxing.156 
                                                                                                     
 152. See id. (“[W]ithout a doubt the law represents a small crack in the CDA 
legal shield that had been undisturbed by Congress since it was passed in 1996.”).  
 153. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the various 
proposals to amend § 230).  
 154. See Daniel J. Solove, Speech, Privacy, and Reputation on the Internet, in 
THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 15, 26 (Saul 
Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010) (proposing a CDA amendment with 
a DMCA-like takedown notice provision for defamation and privacy claims); 
Olivera Medenica & Kaiser Wahab, Does Liability Enhance Credibility: Lessons 
from the DMCA Applied to Online Defamation, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 237, 
239 (2007) (explaining that the DMCA can provide a model for an amendment to 
CDA § 230 for online defamation); Ariel Ronneburger, Sex, Privacy, and 
Webpages: Creating a Legal Remedy for Victims of Porn 2.0, 21 SYRACUSE SCI. & 
TECH. L. REP. 1, 4 (2009) (arguing the DMCA’s takedown notice provision in 
DMCA Title II  provides a model for an amendment to CDA § 230 to address the 
hosting of non-consensual pornographic videos or images); Bradley A. Areheart, 
Regulating Cyberbullies Through Notice-Based Liability, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET 
PART 41 (2007), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/regulating-cyberbullies-
through-notice-based-liability (articulating how some tortious cyberbullying 
could be regulated by amending the CDA with a DMCA-like notice and takedown 
provision); cf. Website Design and Liability, supra note 143, at 418 (proposing a 
“response-and-identification safe harbor” under which a “website operator may 
notify the poster and the poster may elect to stand by the posting by identifying 
herself. The posting would then become an ‘identified’ posting and the website 
operator would be immune from civil liability”); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. 
Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335, 409 (2005) (suggesting 
ISP reform that “implements the DMCA’s safeguards against bad-faith or 
frivolous takedown requests”). 
 155. See Ronneburger, supra note 154, at 24–28 (explaining the DMCA’s 
takedown notice).  
 156. Cf. id. at 30 (arguing for an amendment to the CDA covering only 
revenge porn that is similar to the DMCA takedown notice provision, but not 
proposing any specific liability scheme in connection with the notice requirement).  
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The doxing amendment to the CDA should be modeled off the 2018 
sex trafficking amendment.157 Following the sex trafficking 
amendment, the doxing amendment could exclude from § 230 
immunity violations of a new federal law on doxing that would 
cover both doxing and ghost doxing.158  
Specifically, the doxing legislation should consist of three 
parts. First, a section that is similar to the proposed Online Safety 
Act.159 Second, a section for websites that encourage or otherwise 
induce doxing that bases liability on a theory similar to copyright 
law’s liability theory.160 Third, the legislation should contain a 
section covering non-inducement doxing that could premise 
liability under a theory similar to copyright law’s vicarious liability 
theory.161 For this third section, online intermediaries could only 
be held liable if they received proper notice of doxing content and 
failed to remove it.162 Overall, amending § 230 is a crucial first step 
                                                                                                     
 157. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5) (2012) 
Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be 
construed to impair or limit—(A) any claim in a civil action brought 
under section 1959 of Title 18, if the conduct underlying the claim 
constitutes a violation of 1591 of that title; (B) any charge in a criminal 
prosecution brought under state law if the conduct underlying the 
charge would constitute a violation of section 1591 of Title 18; or (C) 
any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if the 
conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of section 
2421A of Title 18, and promotion or facilitation of prostitution is illegal 
in the jurisdiction where the defendant’s promotion or facilitation of 
prostitution was targeted. 
See also CITRON, supra note 22, at 177 (outlining a § 230 amendment that mirrors 
the existing federal criminal law and intellectual property exemptions). 
 158. Cf. Patrick J. Carome & Ari Holtzblatt, Congress Enacts Law Creating a 
Sex Trafficking Exception from the Immunity Provided By Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, WILMERHALE, https://www.wilmerhale.com/ 
en/insights/client-alerts/2018-04-16-congress-enacts-law-creating-a-sex-
trafficking-exception-from-the-immunity-provided-by-section-230-of-the-
communications-decency-act (last visited Sept. 16, 2019) (explaining the sex 
trafficking amendment excludes “from its [§ 230’s] protection certain conduct that 
would constitute either a violation of federal sex trafficking laws or a criminal 
violation of the new federal criminal prostitution law”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 159. See H.R. 3067, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2017) (proposing criminal and civil 
liability for doxing). 
 160. See infra Part IV.  
 161. See infra Part IV. 
 162. See infra Part IV; see also CITRON, supra note 22, at 178 (articulating 
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to imposing liability on online intermediaries for doxing.  
IV. An Analogy to Copyright Law’s Secondary Liability Scheme 
Once the § 230 immunity for online intermediaries excludes 
doxing, then one can determine the appropriate type of liability to 
impose. Copyright law provides a model for legislation to impose 
secondary liability on online intermediaries for ghost doxing.163 
The Copyright Act of 1976164 does not address secondary liability, 
but the common law of copyright allows for secondary liability.165 
In copyright law there are two ways one can be held secondarily 
liable for copyright infringement: contributory infringement and 
vicarious infringement.166 Contributory infringement occurs “by 
intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement.”167 Put 
another way, “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, 
induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct 
of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”168 
Second, one “infringes vicariously by profiting from direct 
infringement” without stopping or limiting the direct 
infringement.169 Vicarious liability was initially premised on 
                                                                                                     
that her proposed § 230 amendment on nonconsensual pornography could also 
potentially include a safe harbor notice provision).  
 163. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 121–22 (noting copyright law can provide 
some recourse for cyber-harassment victims).  
 164. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012). 
 165. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 
(1984) (“[T]he concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the 
broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one 
individual accountable for the actions of another.”).   
 166. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
929–30 (2005) (explaining secondary liability for infringement may be the only 
practical alternative when “it may be impossible to enforce the rights in the 
protected work effectively against all direct infringers”). 
 167. Id. at 930. 
 168. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (stating the defendant knew that copyrighted works 
were performed at their association’s venue and that “neither the local association 
nor the performing artists would secure a copyright license”). 
 169. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. 
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (describing vicarious liability in 
copyright). 
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agency law’s respondeat superior doctrine,170 but “even in the 
absence of an employer-employee relationship one may be 
vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to supervise the 
infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such 
activities.”171 Thus, vicarious liability in copyright sometimes 
applies even when the entity lacks actual knowledge of the 
wrongful conduct.172 
Just as copyright law provides two types of secondary 
liability, online intermediaries should be subject to two types of 
secondary liability for ghost doxing. First, online intermediaries 
that encourage or induce doxing should be held liable under 
reasoning similar to copyright’s contributory infringement 
theory.173 Second, online intermediaries that are not actively 
inducing or encouraging doxing should be held vicariously liable 
for ghost doxing if they fail to remove the doxed content after 
proper notice.174  
A. Copyright’s Secondary Liability Caselaw 
The leading Supreme Court cases on secondary liability for 
copyright infringement are Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
Studios175 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd.176  
                                                                                                     
 170. See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 (discussing how vicarious liability was 
originally premised on agency law).  
 171. See id. (arguing that in some instances the imposition of vicarious 
liability is appropriate). 
 172.  See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d 
Cir. 1963) 
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and 
direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted 
materials— even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright 
monopoly is being impaired—the purpose of copyright law may be best 
effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that 
exploitation. 
 173. See infra Part IV.A–B (explaining copyright law’s secondary liability 
scheme). 
 174. See infra Part IV.A–B (describing how a notice provision is necessary to 
impose secondary liability in some instances).    
 175. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  
 176. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).  
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In Sony, the Supreme Court considered imposing a claim of 
indirect infringement177 based on the mere distribution of Betamax 
video tape recorders by Sony.178 Universal Studios and Disney 
Productions owned the copyrights on many of the television 
programs that were taped by purchasers of Sony’s Betamax 
recorders.179 The purchasers creating the illegal copies were the 
“direct infringers,” but the Court found Sony did not influence or 
encourage any of the illegal copies.180 The Court reasoned “[i]f 
vicarious liability is to be imposed on petitioners in this case, it 
must rest on the fact that they have sold equipment with 
constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers may use 
that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted 
material.”181 The Supreme Court explained that the imposition of 
vicarious liability here—which was akin to strict liability for the 
end user conduct—was inappropriate.182  
The Supreme Court then turned to the claim of contributory 
infringement.183 It reasoned that “[t]he sale of other articles of 
commerce, [did] not constitute contributory infringement if the 
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.”184 
Instead, the product need only “be capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.”185 Since the Betamax videotape technology 
was capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses,186 
                                                                                                     
 177. “Indirect infringement” is an umbrella term for secondary liability for 
copyright infringement.  
 178. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 438 
(1984) (discussing that the district court found that Sony did not induce any of 
the copies in question to be made). 
 179. See id. at 419, 421 (explaining Universal Studios and Walt Disney owned 
the copyrights for many motion pictures and other audiovisual works). 
 180. See id. at 438 (articulating the district court’s finding that Sony did not 
have “either direct involvement with the allegedly infringing activity or direct 
contact with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyright works off-the-air”).  
 181. Id. at 439. 
 182. See id. (“There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition 
of vicarious liability on such a theory.”).  
 183. See id. (discussing how contributory liability in copyright law and patent 
law differ). 
 184. Id. at 442.  
 185. Id.  
 186. See Peter Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
941, 942 (2007) (noting the commercially significant non-infringing uses in Sony 
were “time-shifting and the recording of public domain programming and 
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Sony was thus not liable for contributory infringement.187 
Over twenty years later, the Court was again confronted 
with the issue of secondary liability for copyright infringement. In 
Grokster, various copyright holders—songwriters, music 
publishers, and motion picture studios (including MGM)—sued 
two peer-to-peer file sharing software distributors, StreamCast 
and Grokster  (“Grokster”), for infringement.188 The software 
functioned through decentralized peer-to-peer networks, which 
prevented Grokster from identifying which files were copied or 
when they were copied.189 Evidence obtained in discovery, 
however, revealed that Grokster was aware that users primarily 
used its software to illegally download copyrighted files, and that 
Grokster intended and encouraged such uses.190 MGM alleged that 
the software distributors “knowingly and intentionally distributed 
their software to enable users to infringe copyrighted works in 
violation of the Copyright Act,” and sought damages and injunctive 
relief.191  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held “that one who distributes 
a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, 
as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to 
foster infringement, is liable for resulting acts of infringement by 
third parties.”192 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s narrow 
reading of Sony,193 which suggested “that whenever a product is 
                                                                                                     
copyrighted broadcasts”). 
 187. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 456 (“Sony’s sale of such equipment to the general 
public does not constitute contributory infringement of respondent’s copyrights.”). 
 188. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
919–20 (2005) (stating the software in question allows users to share files directly 
with one another without going through a central server). 
 189. See id. (describing how Grokster’s software allows users to share 
electronic files through peer-to-peer networks).  
 190. See id. at 922 (discussing that MGM commissioned a systematic search 
and found that ninety percent of files available for download were copyrighted 
works). 
 191. Id. at 921.  
 192. See id. at 937 (“The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on 
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to 
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful 
promise.”). 
 193. See id. at 934 (explaining Sony “was never meant to foreclose rules of 
fault-based liability derived from the common law”). 
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capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can never be held 
contributorily liable for third parties’ infringing use of it.”194 In the 
Court’s review, Sony does not “require courts to ignore evidence of 
intent if there is such evidence [of inducement], and the case was 
never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from 
the common law.”195 The Supreme Court, however, took pains to 
make clear that Grokster did not overturn Sony.196 Rather, 
Grokster underscored the importance of examining evidence of 
inducement when it is present, even if the product is capable of 
substantially non-infringing uses.197  
 
B. Toward a Theory of Secondary Liability for Ghost Doxing 
Copyright provides a useful secondary liability scheme that 
can be applied to ghost doxing.198 First, online intermediaries that 
encourage doxing should be held liable under a contributory 
liability theory similar to copyright law. Second, online 
intermediaries that have non-inducement doxing on their site 
should be liable under a vicarious liability theory if they are given 
notice and fail to remove the content. 
1. Contributory Liability for Encouraging Doxing 
Similar to copyright law, online intermediaries could be held 
secondarily liable when they intentionally induce or encourage 
doxing. Just as Sony was not liable for infringement by users when 
its product had substantially non-infringing uses, it would be bad 
policy to hold online intermediaries liable for doxing when they do 
                                                                                                     
 194. Id. 
 195. See id. at 934–35 (noting Sony does not require courts to ignore evidence 
of inducement because a product is capable of substantial non-infringing use).  
 196. See id. at 934 (stating the Supreme Court intended “to leave further 
consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required”). 
 197. See id. at 937 (“We are, of course, mindful of the need to keep from 
trenching on regular commerce or discouraging the development of technologies 
with lawful and unlawful potential.”).  
 198. See supra notes 49–57 and accompanying text (proposing copyright law’s 
secondary liability scheme as a useful analogy for doxing); see also CITRON, supra 
note 22, at 121–22 (articulating copyright law could potentially provide recourse 
for cyber-harassment victims). 
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no more than provide discussion forums.199 However, online 
intermediaries that encourage posting of personal information by 
ghost doxers or those that make victims pay for removing such 
information should be subject to contributory liability.200 For 
example, various revenge porn websites advertise that they will 
remove content for a fee.201 These types of websites encourage 
doxing and other forms of cyber-harassment and should be held 
liable for the doxing they encourage.202 Encouragement could 
mean advertising for doxing or otherwise attempting to persuade 
third parties to dox.203 Similar to the reasoning used in Grokster, a 
website that is encouraging doxing—  even if it is capable of 
substantial non-doxing uses —could be held contributorily liable if 
there is evidence of doxing encouragement.204 This secondary 
liability should be imposed even without a notice requirement if 
the online intermediary is encouraging the doxing. 
                                                                                                     
 199. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 
(1984) (stating Sony’s tape recorder product was capable of substantial 
non-infringing uses).  
 200. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 175 (discussing extortion sites that 
advertise for revenge porn and other damaging information, such as mug shots, 
and then turn around and profit from the removal of such content); Goldnick, 
supra note 22, at 627 (arguing the CDA could be amended for “ISPs and website 
operators/hosts who purposely proliferate or encourage the proliferation of 
revenge porn”).  
 201. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 174 (outlining various revenge porn 
websites, gossip websites, and even mug shot removal websites that advertise a 
removal or takedown service for specified content for a fee). It is unclear if these 
types of websites have immunity under § 230 currently. See id. at 175 (“It is 
unclear whether Section 230’s immunity extends to sites that effectively engage 
in extortion by encouraging the posting of sensitive private information and 
profiting from its removal.”). 
 202. See id. at 175 (describing various websites that encourage different forms 
of cyber-harassment); Bartow, supra note 61, at 391–92 (stating that the entities 
who market themselves as able to assist those whose reputations have been 
attacked online have incentives to “oppose legal reforms that might enable online 
defamation and harassment victims to seek recourse”).  
 203. Cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 545 U.S. 913, 
927 (2005) (“StreamCast not only rejected another company’s offer of help to 
monitor infringement . . . but blocked the Internet Protocol address of entities it 
believed were trying to engage in such monitoring on its networks.”). 
 204. Cf. id. at 934–35 (articulating that even if a product is capable of 
substantial non-infringing uses, that does not mean a court must ignore evidence 
of inducement if it is present).   
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At least one circuit found an online service provider 
potentially liable for contributing to illegal conduct.205 In Fair 
Housing Council v. Roommates.com,206 the Ninth Circuit denied 
§ 230 immunity to Roommates.com, an online roommate matching 
website, because the site “materially contributed” to the alleged 
violations of the Fair Housing Act and applicable state laws 
through the questionnaires the company required users to fill 
out.207 The Ninth Circuit found that “Roommates’s work in 
developing the discriminatory questions, discriminatory answers 
and discriminatory search mechanism [was] directly related to the 
alleged illegality of the site.”208 Similar to how Roommates.com 
could be held secondarily liable if it encouraged illegal 
discriminatory housing practices,209 sites that encourage doxing 
should be held secondarily liable for doxing.   
                                                                                                     
 205. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 
2008) (explaining because “Roommate created the questions and choice of 
answers, and designed its website registration process around them” the website 
was an “information content provider” for these questions, which allegedly 
violated the Fair Housing Act and state laws), rev’d on other grounds, 666 F.3d 
1216 (9th Cir. 2012) (vacating the district court’s judgment for plaintiff on remand 
because “Roommates’ prompting, sorting and publishing of information to 
facilitate selection is not forbidden by” the applicable laws); Gallardo, supra note 
80, at 738 (discussing the implications of the Ninth Circuit’s Roommates.com case 
on § 230 immunity); but see Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 
F.3d 398, 401–03 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating how the Sixth Circuit said that an 
encouragement test was not the correct test for determining whether a website 
was eligible for immunity under CDA § 230). 
 206. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 207. See id. at 1167–71 (finding an internet service provider that designed a 
website intended to solicit and enforce allegedly illegal housing preferences 
“materially contributed” to illegality and therefore was not entitled to immunity 
under § 230). The Ninth Circuit did find that the operator was entitled to 
immunity for the “Additional Comments” section of the website. See id. at 1174 
(describing the “Additional Comments” section of the website as a “generic prompt 
[that] does not make [the site] a developer of the information posted”). 
 208. See id. at 1172 (“Roommate is directly involved with developing and 
enforcing a system that subjects subscribers to allegedly discriminatory housing 
practices.”).  
 209. Contra Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, 666 F.3d 1216, 1224 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (articulating that on remand that the Ninth Circuit ultimately found 
Roommate not liable because the “prompting, sorting and publishing of 
information to facilitate roommate selection is not forbidden by the FHA” or the 
applicable state housing law).  
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2. Vicarious Liability for Non-Inducement Doxing 
For online intermediaries not actively encouraging doxing, 
vicarious liability is more appropriate. Vicarious liability is 
arguably the more widely applicable form of secondary liability 
because online intermediaries do, typically, have the right and 
ability to control what is posted on their sites and have a financial 
interest in such activities.210 While online intermediaries do have 
the right and ability to control what is posted on their sites, that 
does not mean it is reasonable to expect them to “police” the 
internet for harms created by others using their platform.211 
Therefore, when there is non-induced doxing activity on a website, 
an online intermediary should be held secondarily liable if it fails 
to remove doxing content after receiving proper notice.212  
3. How the DMCA’s Notice Provision Can Be Applied to Ghost 
Doxing 
Copyright law, through the DMCA, provides a useful 
framework for a notice and takedown provision that can be applied 
to doxing.213 The DMCA provides safe harbors for online service 
providers that insulate them from copyright liability if they comply 
with the statutory provisions.214 The safe harbor provisions of the 
DMCA reflect the idea that an online service provider “cannot be 
held liable for contributory infringement merely because the 
structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted 
material.”215 Following this same logic, DMCA § 512(c)’s takedown 
                                                                                                     
 210. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 180 (explaining in some situations it is in 
the interest of a website to keep up material that attracts viewers and advertising 
revenue). 
 211. See SOLOVE, supra note 129, at 152 (discussing how it is unrealistic for 
online intermediaries to police all the content on their sites). 
 212. See infra Part IV.B.3 (arguing the DMCA can provide a model for a 
parallel anti-doxing notice and takedown provision).  
 213. See supra notes 153–155, 161–162 and accompanying text (describing 
how the DMCA could be used as a model for a cyber-harassment regulatory notice 
provision).  
 214. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (2012) (outlining the four safe harbor 
provisions for service providers).   
 215. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 
1021 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 
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notice provision provides an excellent model for a notice 
requirement that could be applied to an online intermediary with 
ghost doxing on its site. 
Under the DMCA, a service provider must meet certain 
threshold criteria to qualify for the safe harbor provisions.216 First, 
the party must be a “service provider,” as defined in the statute.217 
Second, a party must satisfy “conditions of eligibility.”218 
Conditions of eligibility for service providers include: enforcing a 
“repeat infringer” policy that terminates subscribers and account 
holders who repeatedly infringe copyrights219 and not interfering 
with technical measures “used by copyright owners to identify or 
protect copyrighted works.”220 Third, a service provider must 
designate an agent publicly to receive notice of alleged 
infringements.221 
A qualified service provider must also meet the criteria 
outlined within the specific safe harbor provision.222 Under 
§ 512(c)(1), safe harbor from secondary liability for infringement is 
only available if the service provider:  
• Does not have actual knowledge of infringing 
material,223  
                                                                                                     
1021 (9th Cir. 2001)).  
 216. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(discussing the threshold requirements for service providers to qualify for DMCA 
safe harbor).  
 217. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(b) (defining service provider as “a provider of 
online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor”). 
 218. See id. § 512(i)(1)(A) (listing conditions of eligibility). 
 219. Id. 
 220. See id. §§ 512(i)(1)(B), 512(i)(2) (articulating conditions of eligibility and 
defining standard technical measures).  
 221. See id. § 512(c)(2) (stating information about an agent should include at 
least their name, address, phone number, and electronic mail address and must 
be made available publicly).  
 222. See id. § 512(a)–(d) (outlining the four safe harbor provisions for service 
providers). Subsection (l) states a failure to qualify for a limitation of liability 
under this section does not affect the consideration of a defense by the service 
provider that they did not engage in infringing conduct. Id. § 512(l); see also 
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27 (discussing how each of the four DMCA safe harbor 
provisions have slightly different criteria). 
 223. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012).  
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o Does not have “red flag” knowledge,224 or  
o Upon obtaining knowledge or “red flag” 
knowledge acts to remove or disable 
access to the notified material;225 
• “Does not receive a financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing activity” when “the 
service provider has the right and ability to control 
such activity;”226 and  
• When proper notice of infringing material is given, 
the service provider removes or disables access to 
the material in a timely manner.227  
Courts have distinguished between actual knowledge228 and 
so-called “red flag” knowledge.229  
Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.230 is a key case 
that applies § 512(c)’s safe harbor provision.231 The plaintiffs in 
Viacom alleged direct and secondary copyright infringement 
“based on the public performance, display, and reproduction of 
approximately 79,000 audiovisual ‘clips’ that appeared on the 
YouTube website between 2005 and 2008.”232 The defendant 
YouTube argued it was within the safe harbor.233 The Second 
Circuit held that for a service provider to have actual knowledge 
or so-called “red flag” knowledge, it must be aware of “specific and 
                                                                                                     
 224. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).  
 225. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).  
 226. Id. § 512(c)(1)(B); see also Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38 (explaining the benefit 
and control provision requires more than the ability to remove or block material, 
but also acknowledging “something more” is difficult to define). 
 227. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).  
 228. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).  
 229. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii); see Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 
31 (2d Cir. 2012) (clarifying the nuances of actual knowledge and red flag 
knowledge in § 512(c)); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 
718 F.3d 1006, 1023 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining the § 512(c) safe harbor provisions 
for actual knowledge and red flag knowledge both require the service provider to 
know of instances of infringing conduct). 
 230. 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 231. See id. at 26 (concluding the “§ 512(c) safe harbor requires knowledge or 
awareness of specific infringing activity”).  
 232. Id. The clips included Bud Light commercials and Premier League 
games. Id. at 33–34. 
 233. See id. at 26 (discussing whether YouTube was within the § 512(c) safe 
harbor).  
1342 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1307 (2019) 
identifiable infringing activity.”234 The court vacated the summary 
judgment order in favor of YouTube “because a reasonable jury 
could find that YouTube had actual knowledge or awareness of 
specific infringing activity on its website.”235 If the relevant 
decision makers at YouTube did in fact have that knowledge, then 
that knowledge triggered an obligation for the site to remove the 
infringing material in a timely manner.236 On remand, however, 
the court found the safe harbor applied and granted YouTube’s 
motion for summary judgment.237 
The DMCA’s takedown notice requirement should be applied 
to doxing.238 Under the DMCA, the takedown notice must be 
written and provided to the service provider’s designated agent.239 
The notice must include a signature of the person authorized to act 
on behalf of the copyright owner; identification of the infringed 
copyright work or works; enough information to allow the service 
provider to contact the complaining party; a statement that the 
notification is accurate under penalty of perjury and that the 
complainant is authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner; 
and that the complaining party has a good faith belief that the 
material being complained about is not an authorized use.240 If 
proper takedown notice is provided, the service provider is 
required to “act expeditiously” to remove the material.241 This 
takedown notice provision is used often. For example, Google has 
                                                                                                     
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. Emails between relevant YouTube decision makers discussed specific 
infringing content, such as Premier League games and Bud Light commercials, 
that allegedly remained on the site following the email discussions. Id. at 33–34. 
 236. See id. at 27–28 (articulating that once knowledge is established, the 
service provider must then timely remove the infringing content).  
 237. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 123 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (conveying YouTube was within the § 512(c) safe harbor). 
 238. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2012) (listing the elements of proper notice and 
explaining what a service provider must do if given proper notice). 
 239. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A) (providing details on the takedown notice 
provision). 
 240. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(vi) (detailing the requirements of a proper 
takedown notice under the DMCA).  
 241. Id. § 512(c); see Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27–28 
(2d Cir. 2012) (“[A]ctual knowledge of infringing material, awareness of facts or 
circumstances that make infringing activity apparent, or receipt of a takedown 
notice will each trigger an obligation to expeditiously remove the infringing 
material.”). 
REACHING THROUGH THE GHOST DOXER 1343 
a tracking service — Google Transparency Report — that provides 
an ongoing tally of URLs for which the site has received takedown 
notice notifications.242  
A vicarious liability scheme coupled with a notice provision 
could provide the outline of a ghost doxing liability statute for 
non-inducement doxing. Specifically, the ghost doxing notice and 
takedown provision could parallel the DMCA § 512(c).243 The ghost 
doxing provision should require online intermediaries to designate 
an agent to receive notice of doxing content.244 The takedown notice 
specifics in § 512(c)(3) should also be used as a model as they 
provide specific instructions for notifying an intermediary of 
doxing content.245 
Experience has shown that it is unrealistic to assume that 
online intermediaries will unilaterally police the internet to 
prevent doxing.246 Thus, this Note does not propose legislation that 
places an affirmative duty on online intermediaries to seek out and 
eliminate instances of doxing.247 Further, the DMCA’s good faith 
belief component would also be crucial to incorporate into a 
parallel anti-doxing notice and takedown provision. Requiring a 
good faith belief by the complainant that the content posting 
constitutes doxing will help prevent complaints by those who 
simply disagree with the content of the reported post.248 Overall, a 
                                                                                                     
 242. See Transparency Report, GOOGLE, 
https://transparencyreport.google.com/copyright/overview?hl=en (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2019) (listing the number of URLs submitted for delisting as of September 
8, 2019 at 4,243,160,549) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 243. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (requiring notice and timely takedown for a 
service provider to be within the safe harbor provision).   
 244. See id. § 512(c)(2) (noting a designated agent’s contact information must 
be publicly available).  
 245. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(vi) (outlining the requirements for DMCA 
takedown notice).  
 246. See Rustad & Keonig, supra note 154, at 351 (“ISPs currently have no 
duty to police the Internet or to develop technologies to track down off-shore 
posters of objectionable materials.”).  
 247. Cf. § 512(m) (stating the applicability of § 512(a)–(d) is not conditioned 
on “a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts 
indicating infringing activity”).   
 248. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 179 (explaining the “heckler’s veto” 
concept, which says that “people will complain about speech because they dislike 
the speakers or object to their views, not because they have suffered actual 
harm”).  
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notice provision similar to DMCA will provide the online 
intermediary an opportunity to remove the doxing content in a 
timely manner and be immunized if they comply.  
V. Conclusion 
Doxing is a growing problem that causes harm in the real 
“offline” world. The law needs to be updated to address modern 
harms like doxing. The outdated blanket immunity of the CDA 
§ 230 should be narrowed to be more in line with the realities of 
today’s internet and allow online intermediaries to potentially be 
held liable in limited circumstances for doxing. To adequately 
address doxing, however, amending the CDA is not enough. 
Congress also needs to pass legislation that directly addresses both 
doxing and ghost doxing. Specifically, Congress should pass 
legislation similar to the proposed Online Safety Act, but also 
amend that legislation to include two new sections that address 
ghost doxing.  
To address ghost doxing, copyright law provides a persuasive 
analogy for imposing secondary liability on online intermediaries. 
Online intermediaries that intentionally induce or encourage 
doxing should be held secondarily liable under a contributory 
theory that is similar to contributory infringement under copyright 
law. Vicarious liability, however, is a more appropriate type of 
secondary liability for an online intermediary that is not actively 
inducing doxing. An online intermediary should not be held 
vicariously liable unless it was given proper notice of the doxing 
content and failed to remove it. Society should no longer allow 
online intermediaries to avoid liability for the legitimate harms 
done by doxing. 
